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Deferring Unfair Labor Practice
Charges . To Pre-existing
Arbitration Awards
By Steven H. Heisler

A controversial area in the field of labor
law is the National Labor Relations Board
policy of deferring unfair labor practice
charges to pre-existing arbitration awards.
This article traces the history of the
Board's policy from the Spielberg doctrine
to the Olin policy.
The National Labor Relations Act was
enacted by Congress in 1935 with the aim
of eliminating industrial unrest caused by
the denial of collective bargaining rights to
workers. Section 1 of the Act states:
Experience has proved that protectionby law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes
the flow of commerce by removing
certain recognized sources of industrial
strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly
adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of difference as to wages, hours
or other working conditions, and by
restoring quality of bargaining power
between employers and employees. 1
Section 7 of the Act provides that "employees shall have the right to selforganization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protec-

tion ... "2 Section 8(a) (1) of the Act states
that it is an unfair labor practice for an
employer to "interfere with, restrain, or
coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in Section 7."3 Section
8(a) (3) of the Act makes it an unfair labor
practice for an employer to discriminate
"in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage
membership in any labor organization ... "4 Section 8(a) (5) of the Act provides that it is an unfair labor practice for
an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees, subject to the provisions of
Section 9(a). "5
Congress, in Section 3 of the Act, created the National Labor Relations Board to
administer the Act. Section 10(a) of the
Act grants the Board the power "to prevent any person from engaging in any
unfair labor practice."6 Thus, Congress
established a forum for workers to seek
redress of violations of their Section 7 and
8 rights. When an individual believes he is
the victim of an unfair labor practice he
may file a charge with one of the Board's
regional offices. The case is assigned to a
Board agent who investigates the matter
and decides whether or not to recommend
that a complaint be issued against the
charged party. The Board has the power to
serve orders requiring charged parties to
cease and desist from such unfair labor
practices as well as ordering reinstatement

of illegally discharged employees with
back pay.7 If a complaint is issued the
charged party has the right to request that
the case be brought before an administrative law judge for a hearing. Either party can appeal an ALJ decision to the full
five person Board.
Section 6 of the Act states that "the
Board shall have the authority from time
to time to make . . . such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of [the] Act."8 The Board has
been accorded wide discretion since its
inception in promulgating policy without
judicial interference provided it has a
rational basis for the policy.9 One such
example is the Board's policy of deferral of
unfair labor practice charges to preexisting arbitration awards.
In Spielberg Manufacturing Company
(1955)10 the union and the company agreed
on arbitration as a method of resolving the
status of four employees who were discharged for picket line misconduct during
a strike. A three-member arbitration panel
found that the grievants were discharged
for just cause. The union subsequently filed an unfair labor practice charge with the
Board. The Board first stated that it is not
bound by an arbitration award. The Board
quoted the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. Walt
Disney Productions (1944) which stated,
"Clearly agreements between private parties cannot restrict the jurisdiction of the
Board. We believe the Board may exercise
jurisdiction in any case of an unfair labor
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practice when in its discretion its interference is necessary to protect the public
rights defined in the Act."11 Nevertheless,
the Board deferred to the arbitration
panel's decision, commonly referred to as
the Spielberg doctrine. The Board declared
that where the arbitration proceedings
appear to have been fair and regular, all
parties have agreed to be bound, and the
decision of the arbitrator is not clearly
repugnant to the purposes and policies of
the Act, it would defer.12 The Board stated
that deferring in those circumstances
would best serve the "desirable objective
of encouraging the voluntary settlement of
labor disputes."13 The Board declined to
answer whether it would have decided the
strike misconduct issue the same way as
the arbitrator decided.
In Raytheon Company (1962)14 the Board
ntled that it would not defer where the
record indicated that the arbitrator did not
consider the unfair labor practice issue
brought before him. IS In Raytheon the
grievant was discharged for allegedly inciting a walkout. The case proceeded to arbitration where the termination was upheld.
The Board refused to defer, citing three
reasons: a) in opening argument at the
arbitration hearing, counsel for the union
specifically limited the scope of the arbitrator's jurisdiction to the contractual issue;
b) no evidence of the grievant's union
activity establishing that the grievant was
fired for protected or union activity was
disclosed at the arbitration; and c) the company official who discharged the grievant
and who testified at the unfair labor practice hearing in which the ALJ determined
that the company violated section 8(a) (1)
and (3) of the Act, did not appear at the
arbitration. The Board, refusing to defer to
the arbitrator's decision, concluded that
the arbitrator limited his decision to the
contractual issue.
The dissent in Raytheon claimed that
both the statutory and contractual issues
were factually the same. "The underlying
factual issue in both the arbitration and the
unfair labor practice proceedings was
whether the discharges engaged in a walkout or in conduct inciting a walkout."16
The majority disagreed stating that the
only factual issue presented to the arbitrator was whether the discharge violated the
no-strike clause of the contract. The arbitrator received no evidence of the grievant's union activities or whether the
discharge by Raytheon was motivated
because of the grievant's union activity.
Thus, the arbitrator did not pass upon the
facts of the statutory issueY The Raytheon
decision is important because the Board
added a fourth criterion to the Spielberg
doctrine. Now for the Board to defer, it

has to be satisfied that the arbitrator purported to consider the unfair labor practice
Issue.
The Board further elaborated on the
Raytheon standard in Airco Industrial Gases
(1972).18 In A irco, the grievant was discharged for negligence in his duties as a
leadman in the trailer maintenance department. In the arbitration proceeding the
union stated that the issue to be decided
was whether the grievant was fired in violation of the collective bargaining agreement. The agreement contained a clause
prohibiting discrimination against any
employee for union affiliation or activity.
The grievant contended that his discharge
was motivated by the fact that he had filed
over 200 grievances in the previous two
years of his employment; however, no evidence of this issue was presented at the
arbitration hearing. The arbitrator ruled
that the discipline was for just cause but
reduced it to a suspension. In upholding
the ALl's decision not to defer, the Board

the Board
deferred to the
arbitration panel's
decision ... the
Spielberg doctrine.:"
maintained that there was no indication in
the arbitrator's decision that he considered
the issue of whether the grievant was fired
for his union activity.19 The Board refuted
the dissent's argument that the contract
contained a clause prohibiting discrimination for union activity or affiliation and
that therefore the individual was precluded
from bringing the unfair labor practice
charge:
Apparently our dissenting colleague is
of the same view (that the arbitrator
did not consider the unfair labor practice issue), since he relies not only on
the tenuous evidence that the unfair
labor practice issue was in fact litigated, but on a wholly new res judicata
doctrine, under which he would hold
that there was a duty to litigate it
before the arbitrator. We do not accept
this doctrine, which amounts to be an
absolute abdication of the Board's
responsibility simply because of a
pious protestation in the contract that

the Company will not discriminate against
employees because of their union activities
or affiliation.20
In Yourga Trucking (1972)21 the Board
held that the burden of proving that the
unfair labor practice issue had been adequately presented to and considered by the
arbitrator rests with the party raising the
affirmative defense. 22 "That party may be
presumed to have the strongest interest in
establishing that the issue has been previously litigated, if that is the case."23
Two years later, the Board overruled
Airco and Yourga in Electronic Reproduc·
tion Service Corporation (1974).24 In that
decision the Board stated that in discharge
and discipline cases, absent unusual circumstances, it would defer to an arbitration decision where the grieving party had
an opportunity to present evidence of an
unfair labor practice to the arbitrator. 25
The Board stated that the purpose of
Spielberg was to encourage the resolution
of disputes between unions and management with the mechanism they voluntarily created - the grievance and arbitration
procedure. When the fact of a contractual
dispute present an unfair labor practice
issue as well, the Board stated that Spielberg
dictated that the parties must resolve both
issues in the arena upon which they mutually agreed provided that the arbitration
proceeding is fair and regular, both parties
agree to be bound, and the arbitrator's
decision is not clearly repugnant to the
Act. According to the Board, arbitration as
a means of settling disputes discourages
forum shopping and dual litigation and
reduces the possibility that the individual
will receive 'two bites of the apple.' The
Board commented:

If ... we are to continue to encourage,
require and generally honor the use of
available grievance and arbitration
procedures to achieve dispute settlement, we ought not encourage either
party to withhold from those voluntary procedures full information or
relevant evidence on issues scheduled
for discussion in the grievance procedure or for hearing by an arbitrator. 26
Thus, the Board reasoned that in discipline
and discharge cases evidence showing that
the grievant was disciplined in violation of
the Act would have a bearing on the contracutal issue and help determine whether
the grievant was disciplined for just cause.
The Board therefore concluded that absent
a bona fide reason (such as unusual circumstances) it would defer to an arbitrator's decision if the grievant is given the
opportunity to present the unfair labor
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practice issue even if the statutory issue
was not actually presented. A scenario in
which the Board would not defer is one
where the arbitrator specifically refused to
pass on the statutory issue, or where both
parties agreed to exclude statutory issues
from the arbitration proceeding.
The dissent argued that the majority's
ruling eliminated the Raytheon requirement that before deferring, the arbitrator
must consider the unfair labor practice
Issue.
This means, of course, that the Board
for all practicial purposes will no
longer decide any part of a case which
has been or could have been decided
by an arbitrator who has issued an
award. It also apparently means that
the Board will defer to an arbitrator
cases which have not yet been, but
could be the subject of an award.
Adding the two together means that
the Board will not henceforth decide
any statutory violations by a union or
an employer where they have an arbitration clause in their collective bargaining agreement. That is, unions and
employers can agree to contract themselves out of the Act by inserting an
arbitration clause into the agreementP

Electronic Reproduction represented a differing interpretation of Spielberg. A irco,
adopting the Raytheon criterion, ruled that

unfair labor practice was not presented by
the grievant at either of the arbitration
hearings. The Board refused to defer stating that it had basically abandoned the
Electronic Reproduction doctrine. "Our
experience with Electronic Reproduction
has led to the conclusion that it promotes
the statutory purpose of encouraging
collective-bargaining relationships, but
derogates the equally important purpose
of protecting employees in the exercise of
their rights under Section 7 of the Act."29
Thus, the Board stated that it would not
defer unless the unfair labor practice issue
was both presented to and considered by
the arbitrator. "In accord with the rule
formerly stated in Airco Industrial Gases,
we will give no deference to an arbitration
award which bears no indication that the
arbitrator ruled on the statutory issue of

"the Board ...
would not defer
unless the unfair
labor practice issue
was both presented
to and considered by
the arbitrator. n

it would be an unwarranted extension of

Spielberg to permit the Board to defer
where there was no evidence that the arbitrator did not consider the unfair labor
practice issue. Electronic Reproduction,
however, stated that Spielberg embraced
arbitration as the preferred method of dispute resolution and that it would defer to
that process when an unfair labor practice
issue could be resolved there. While the
Electronic Reproduction Board stated that it
would not defer where the arbitrator specifically refused to pass on the unfair labor
practice issue, it was silent regarding its
position towards an award where the arbitrator receives evidence of the statutory
issue but does not consider it in his
decision.
The Airco proponents struck back in
Suburban Motor Freight (1980).28 In Subur·
ban Motor Freight, the grievant was terminated twice by the company. Both
times the grievant was reinstated with a
reduced discipline by the arbitrator. The
grievant then filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the Board claiming he was discharged in violation of 8(a) (1) and (3). The
company, relying on Electronic Reproduc·
tion, argued that deferral was appropriate.
It maintained that evidence of the alleged

discrimination in determining the propriety of an employer's disciplinary's
actions."3o Furthermore, the Board in Sub·
urban Motor Freight stated that it would
return to the Yourga standard and impose
on the party seeking deferral the burden of
proving that the statutory issue was litigated before and decided by the arbitrtor. 3l
However, the Suburban Motor Freight,
rule was short-lived. The Board again
reversed its position regarding deferral in
Olin Corporation (1984).32 Olin is the current Board position on deferral. Today,
the Board will defer to an existing arbitration award and find that an arbitrator has
adequately considered an unfair labor practice issue if (1) the contractual issue is factually parallel to the unfair labor practice
issue, and (2) the arbitrator was presented
generally with the facts relevant to resolving the unfair labor practice. The Board
will weigh any differences between the
contractual and statutory standards of
review by the Spielberg "clearly repugnant" standard. Furthermore, the Board
will not require an arbitrator's decision to
be totally consistent with Board precedent

when deferring. The Board will defer
unless the arbitrator's decision is "palpably wrong" and not susceptible to an interpretation consistent with the Act. Finally,
the Board will require the party arguing
against deferral to show that the above criteria have not been met. 33
In Olin, the grievant, the Union President, was discharged for his part in encouraging a "sick out" at work. At the
arbitration hearing, the arbitrator found
that the grievant partially caused and participated in the "sick out" and failed to
stop it after it had occurred. The arbitrator
ruled that the grievant's actions violated
the No-Strike clause of the collectivebargaining agreement and his discharge
was for just cause. Addressing the unfair
labor practice issue the arbitrator stated
that there was no evidence that the grievant was discharged for his legitimate
union activities. The regional director
issued a complaint after investigating the
grievant's unfair labor practice charges.
Though the ALJ refused to defer, he dismissed the charges on the merits. The
Board, applying Olin, refused to review
the case on its merits and deferred. First,
the Board stated that the contractual and
statutory issues were factually parallel.
Indeed, the arbitrator noted that the
factual questions that he was required
to determine were '1) whether or not
there was a sick out and 2) whether the
grievant caused, participated in or failed to attempt to stop the sick out, i.e.,
whether the grievant failed to meet the
obligation imposed upon him by Article XIV: These factual questions are
co-extensive with those that would be
considered by the Board in a decision
on the statutory question - i.e.,
whether the collective-bargaining
agreement clearly and unmistakably
prescribed the behavior engaged in by
Union President Spatorico on 17
December, 1980. 34
Next, the Board stated that the General
Counsel did not meet the burden of proving that the arbitrator was not presented
with the facts necessary to determine the
unfair labor practice issue. Finally, the
Board ruled that the decision was not
clearly repugnant to the Act because there
was a reasonable basis to conclude that the
grievant violated the No-Strike clause as
well as an additional clause which prohibited officers from encouraging similar
activity.
In dissent, member Zimmerman stated:
under Electronic Reproduction and
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under the rule adopted today the result
is the same: The Board will now defer
to an arbitrator's award on a presumption that an unfair labor practice issue
has been resolved, without actually
knowing if the issue was presented to
or considered by the arbitrator. 35
Zimmerman first argued that the Olin
standard is an abdication of the Board's
statutory obligations under Section 1o(a)
of the Act.
Nowhere in the Act itself, its legislative history, or in its judicial interpretation is there authority for the proposition that the federal labor policy
favoring arbitration requires or permits the Board to abstain from effectuating the equally important federal
labor policy entrusted to the Board
under Section 10(a).36
Secondly, Zimmerman cited several Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decisions
upholding the Suburban Motor Freight doctrine that the Board has no authority to
defer if it has no proof that the arbitrator
was presented with and considered the
unfair labor practice issue. In Stephenson v.
NLRB (1977) the Ninth Circuit stated:
Merely because the arbitrator is presented with a problem which involved
both contractual and unfair labor practice elements does not necessarily
mean that he will adequately consider
the statutory and merely because he
considers the statutory issue does not
mean that he will enforce the rights of
the parties pursuant to and consistent
with the Act. 37
Thus, the Ninth Circuit declared that the
arbitrator must "clearly decide" the unfair
labor practice issue before the Board may
defer. Similarly, in United Parcel Seroice v.
NLRB (1983) the Third Circuit ruled that
"for the Board's deferral policy not to be
one of abdication, the Board must be presented with some evidence that the statutory issue has actually been decided."38
Third, Zimmerman criticized the overruling of You1&a and the new requirement
that the party arguing against deferral
must show that the Olin standard has not
been met. According to Zimmerman, the
party seeking deferral almost always has
ready access to testimony and relevant
records of the arbitration hearing and is in
a better position to establish whether the
statutory issue was addressed by the arbitrator. Furthermore, Zimmerman argued
that it is improper to place the burden of
proving an affirmative defense on any par-

ty other than the party raising the defense.
To invoke a presumption and shift the
burden of disproving a naked defense
claim to the General Counsel amounts
to an abuse of the Board's discretion.
In effect, once the existence of an arbitration award has been proved by a
respondent, the majority will transform an affirmative defense into part
of the General Counsel's prima facie
case.39
Fourth, Zimmerman contended that the

Olin standard, in reality, discourages parties to arbitrate their differences. According to Zimmerman, the frequency of
deferrals will strain the resources of
involved parties and arbitrations will soon
resemble unfair labor practice hearings as
unions comply with their duties to fairly
represent their members.
While the Board in Olin departs from
the Electronic Reproduction standard that
deferral is appropriate where the grieving
party could have brought evidence of the
unfair labor practice issue before the arbitrator, it is similar to Electronic Reproduction in that it permits deferral without
requiring proof that the arbitrator actually
considered the statutory issue in his
decision. The Board in Olin states that it
must adhere to a "limited application" of

''[the standard]
permits deferral
without requiring
proof that the
arbitrator actually
considered the
statutory issue."
Raytheon to remain consistent with the
Spielberg policy favoring the voluntary set-

tlement of disputes. 4o Thus, while the
Board states that adequate consideration of
the unfair labor practice issue by the arbitrator is a criterion in judging the appropriateness of deferral, it defines adequate
consideration as a factual parallelism of the
contractual and statutory issue and the
presentation of the facts of the unfair labor
practice issue to the arbitrator. As long as
the arbitrator's decision is not "palpably

wrong" the Board will defer.
A consensus has not been reached by the
circuits concerning Olin. In Taylor v.
NLRB, (1986}41 the eleventh circuit refused
to uphold the Board's ruling to defer, stating that the Olin standard "gives away too
much of the Board's responsibility under
the NLRA."42 The eleventh circuit takes
the position of the ninth circuit in Stephen·
son, supra, and the third circuit in United
Parce~ supra, that for the Board to fulfill
it's statutory responsibility to prevent
unfair labor practices under 10(a) of the
N1.RA it cannot defer unless it has fully
considered and resolved the statutory
issue. The problem with Olin, according
to the court, is that the standard cannot
guarantee that all arbitration proceedings
will address and resolve every unfair labor
practice issue. 43 While contractual and statutory issues may be factually parallel, the
issues may also "involve distinct elements
of proof and questions of factual
relevance."44 The court asserts that the
failure of an arbitrator to fully examine
and decide an unfair labor practice issue is
an abandonment of the Spielberg doctrine's
first requirement, that the arbitration proceedings have been fair and regular. 45
Additionally, the court also contends that
the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander
v.Gardner-Denver Co. (1974),46 that an
employee may assert a Title VII claim
independent of a grievance brought to
arbitration under a collective bargaining
agreement, stands for the proposition that
deferral is not appropriate unless the arbitrator addressed and resolved the statutory
issueY
However, the second circuit in Nevins v.
NLRB {1986}48 stated that the Board's right
to defer an unfair labor practice charge to
a pre-existing arbitration decision is discretionary and absent abuse it will defer. 49
Thus, the court asserts that while it is not
called upon to decide the issue of whether
Olin sufficiently protects employee rights
under the NLRA as was reached in Taylor,
it does not challenge the Olin standard.50
Furthermore in Lewis v. NLRB, {1985'1
the sixth circuit ruled that where there is
evidence that the unfair labor practice
issue was presented to and considered by
the arbitrator it will find the Olin standard
satisfied despite the fact that "the arbitration panel could have dealt more fully
with the [statutory] issues presented at the
hearing."52 The sixth circuit's apparent
willingness to permit deferral where the
unfair labor practice charge was not fully
dealt with by the arbitrator confirms the
eleventh circuit's main fear that under
Olin, the Board presumes that all arbitration proceedings confront and decide
every possible statutory issue when that
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actually is not the case.
The D.C. Circuit has previou<!.:; "ffirmed Board deferral where the statutory and
contractual issues were factually similar
and the arbitrator decided the statutory
issue. Bloom v. NLRB {1979}53. However,
in Darr v. NLRB, (1986,' the court refused
to affirm Board deferral where the arbitrator's decision contradicted clear Board
precedent. The court stated that while the
arbitrator decided both the contractual
and statutory issues the arbitrator considered the statutory issue in a "tentative
fashion" and did not attempt to "reconcile
the different bodies of applicable law."55
The eleventh circuit commented:
We have profound doubts that the
Board may defer to an arbitrator's
award merely because the award is
roughly analogous to that which the
Board would grant - a sort of "Kentucky Windage" approach without
explicitly articulating its view of the
interrelationship between the law of a
particular collective bargaining agreement and the NLRA.56
Conclusion
The Board's policy of deferring unfair
labor practice charges to pre-existing arbitration awards has not been consistent. In
Electronic Reproduction the Board revised
it's policy set forth in Raytheon and Airco
tht in order to defer it had to be proved
that the arbitrator actually dealt with the
statutory charge. Under Electronic Repro·
duction the Board would defer where,
absent unusual circumstances, the grievant
had the opportunity to present the statutory issue to the arbitrator. With the exception of where the parties agreed to exclude
the statutory issue from the arbitrator's
consideration or where the arbitrator specifically refuses to deal with the statutory
issue, the Board was not concerned with
whether the arbitrator actually considered
the issue. Suburban Motor Freight reestablished the Board's pre-Electronic Reproduction policy of the arbitrator's duty to
consider the unfair labor practice charge.
Olin now states that the Board will find
that the arbitrator has adequately considered the statutory issue when the contractual' issue is factually parallel to the
statutory issue and the arbitrator was presented with the facts relevant to resolving
the unfair labor practice charge.
The foregoing can be divided into two
basic schools of thought on Board deferral.
The first, represented by Raytheon and
Suburban Motor Freight, requires that the
Board actually consider the statutory issue
before deferring. In contrast, the latter
school of thought, endorsed by the Board

in Electronic Reproduction and Olin does
not necessarily demand actual consideration to justify deferral. This has been criticized as an abdication of the Board's duty
under Section 10(a), of the NLRA, to prevent unfair labor practices. The proponents of the Electronic Reproduction and
Olin, however point to Section 203(d) of
the Labor Management Relations Act,57
which amended the NLRA, delcaring that
"final adjustment by a method agreed
upon by the parties is ... the desirable
method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an eXlstmg collective
bargaining agreement."58 It is the Board's
position that if the parties agree on arbitration as the preferred method of resolving
disputes deferral is appropriate provided it
is not repugnant to the Act.
Whether Olin will continue to be the
Board policy on deferral depends on
whose administration replaces President
Reagan's in January 1989. If the Republicans remain in office it is most likely that
George Bush will seek confirmation of
conservative, pro-management appointees.
A Republican dominated Board will likely
wish to maintain the status quo (Olin).
However, a Democratic administration,
headed by Michael Dukakis, will likely
appoint members who believe that
workers statutory rights cannot be subordinated to the arbitration process and who
subscribe to the Raytheon· Suburban Motor
Freight line of cases.
Finally, in Alexander v. Gardner .
Denver the Supreme Court declined to
defer and declared that a worker has a
right to have his Title VII claim adjudicated regardless of whether he pursued a
similar contractual claim through the arbitration process. The court extended the
Alexander v. Gardner· Denver holding to
the Fair Labor Standards Act in Barrentine
v. Arkansas Best Freight System. 59 If and
when the court is confronted with a case
dealing with the Board's deferral of a Section 7 or 8 claim to a pre-existing arbitration award, it will be interesting to see if
the court similarly holds that a worker's
statutory rights preclude the Board from
deferring to the arbitration process.
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